Judicial Misconduct -Showing undue favour to a party under the guise of passing judicial orders is the worst kind of judicial dishonesty and misconduct. The extraneous consideration for showing favour need not always be a monetary consideration. It is often said that "the public servants are like fish in the water, none can say when and how a fish drank the water". A judge must decide the case on the basis of the facts on record and the law applicable to the case. If he decides a case for extraneous reasons, then he is not performing his duties in accordance with law. As often quoted, a judge, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion(Paragraph 15)

The Supreme Court, while upholding the penalty imposed on a judicial officer for misconduct, stated that a judge must always remain above suspicion, "like Caesar's wife".

The Court held that judges must decide a case on the basis of the facts on record and the law applicable to the case.

"If he decides a case for extraneous reasons, then he is not performing his duties in accordance with law. As often quoted, a judge, like Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion," the judgment stated

"A judge, like Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion" - Supreme Court of India

The Court further held that showing undue favour to a party while discharging official duties is the worst kind of judicial misconduct.

"In our opinion, showing undue favour to a party under the guise of passing judicial orders is the worst kind of judicial dishonesty and misconduct. The extraneous consideration for showing favour need not always be a monetary consideration. It is often said that “the public servants are like fish in the water, none can say when and how a fish drank the water” the Court said in its judgment.

"Showing undue favour to a party under the guise of passing judicial orders is the worst kind of judicial dishonesty and misconduct" - Supreme Court of India

The top court's observations came when it was considering a case in which the appellant had joined the Uttar Pradesh judicial services in 1978 and took a voluntary retirement in 2003.

Thereafter he joined the Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai as a judicial member in 2005. Soon, he recieved notice from UP judiciary that departmental proceedings had been initiated against him.

The charges against him were of judicial dishonesty, misconduct and granting higher land compensation to some parties without adhering to the principles of law and justice.

The enquiry officer stated that all 11 charges were proven barring one. When the full court was apprised of the same, it ruled that the appellant would bear a 90 percent cut in his pensionary benefits.

A Full Court of the Allahabad High Court accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer and resolved to punish the appellant with curtailment of 90% of his pensionary benefits with immediate effect.

The appellant challenged the same by filing a petition before the High Court which issued an order reduced it to 70% curtailment of pensionary benefits but upheld 6 of the 11 charges.

The appellant thereafter moved the Supreme Court in appeal, arguing that the charges levelled against him did not make out even a prima facie case of misconduct and that they were neither factually nor legally substantiable.

However, the Supreme Court upheld the Allahabad High Court verdict.

At the outset, the Court stated that maintenance of high standard of conduct and character of the judicial officers has always been a matter of great concern.

Further, it stated that if the inquiry has been fairly and properly conducted, and the findings are based on evidence, "the adequacy of the evidence or reliability of evidence would not be a ground to interfere with the findings recorded in the departmental enquiries."

The Court also noted that the appellant had not made any allegation with regard to violation of principles of natural justice or contravention of any statutory rules or regulations having occasioned during the course of enquiry proceedings or in the decision-making process.

The top court held that interference with the decision of departmental authorities is permissible "only if the proceedings were conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice or in contravention of statutory regulations regulating such proceedings or if the decision on the face of it is found to be arbitrary or capricious".

In absence of any such allegations, the Supreme Court saw no reason to interfere with the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the High Court on the administrative side, and the order passed by the High Court on the judicial side.